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The Enforceable Prepayment Penalty
Robert Boyle*
"We certainly don't want there to be a fine print preventing people
from owning their home. We can change the print, and we've got
to."
1
-President George W. Bush
I. INTRODUCTION
In the early part of this decade, the housing market became erratic.
Investors flocked to real estate. Property values increased despite an
abundance of inventory. The lending industry created tens of millions
of mortgages. Like some modern day gold rush, homeownership beck-
oned to rich and poor alike. The government watched on with dis-
interest as the number of subprime mortgagors leapt.2
In the past two years, the housing market came to a screeching halt.
Havoc ensued. Millions of Americans find themselves trapped in
mortgages they cannot afford. Washington, mired in fear of a reces-
sion and deafened by the cries of wounded investors, has done little to
help. A President who once spoke loftily of promoting homeowner-
ship has fallen silent.3 While Congress debates a permanent solution,
the judiciary can provide much-needed relief to the American people.
The courts should consider subjecting the prepayment provisions
found in many mortgages to a liquidated damages analysis. This would
invalidate a number of the most unconscionable prepayment provi-
* Robert Boyle is an associate at Shefsky & Froelich Ltd. in Chicago, Illinois and received his
Juris Doctorate from the DePaul University College of Law. The author would like to express
his extreme gratitude to his wife, Nicole Boyle, and his advisor, Mariann S. Carbone.
1. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Homeownership (June 17, 2002)
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020617-2.html).
2. In 2004, Edward Gramlich, a former Governor of the Federal Reserve, explained,
"[i]ncreased subprime lending has been associated with higher levels of delinquency, foreclosure,
and in some cases, abusive lending practices." Paul Krugman, A Catastrophe Foretold, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2007. As early as 2000, Mr. Gramlich tried, to no avail, to convince Alan Green-
span to increase oversight of subprime lending. Id.
3. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Signing the American
Dream Downpayment Act (Dec. 16, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edulws/index.php?pid=64935). "This administration will constantly strive to promote an owner-
ship society in America.... It is in our national interest that more people own their own home.
After all, if you own your own home, you have a vital stake in the future of our country." Id.
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sions and give cash-strapped homeowners an opportunity to salvage
something from their investments.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Dream, the Bubble, and the Burst
Homeownership is the most significant investment most Americans
will ever make.4 Home equity provides borrowing power to finance
important needs such as education.5 Homeownership bestows a myr-
iad of social benefits and diminishes the strain on the welfare system.6
Successive presidents have equated homeownership with the Ameri-
can dream, 7 and Congress has incentivized the dream, increasing its
allure. 9 The government subsidizes' 0 homeownership in order to make
it affordable for middle-class Americans." President George W. Bush
4. "A home is the largest financial investment most American families will ever make, and it
allows families to build financial security as the equity in its home increases." The White House,
President George W. Bush, Background, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/homeownership/
homeownership-policy-book-background.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
5. "[A] home is a tangible asset that provides a family with borrowing power to finance im-
portant needs, such as the education of children." Id.
6. "Accumulation of substantial net worth through a lifetime of home ownership means retir-
ees are less dependent on both social security and retirement programs as a source of income in
their retirement years." The American Homeowners Grassroots Alliance, Tax Incentives for
Home Ownership, http://www.americanhomeowners.org/AHGA/AHGA%201ssueslTaxincen-
tives.htm.
7. According to President William J. Clinton:
Owning a home is central to the American dream .... My administration has worked
hard to help more Americans own their own home .... I am determined to press for-
ward with our economic strategy, so that our economy keeps growing and millions
more families can join the ranks of homeowners.
President William J. Clinton, Statement on the Expansion of Homeownership (Oct. 22, 1996)
(transcript available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-m2889/is-n43_v32/ai_19037122).
President George W. Bush shared President Clinton's desire to expand homeownership. See
supra note 1.
8. "Homeowners receive considerable assistance from the federal government in the form of
income tax benefits." Congressional Budget Office, The Tax Treatment of Homeownership: Is-
sues and Opinions, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, at xi
(1981). The tax laws allow homeowners to deduct mortgage interest and property taxes from
their taxable income and reduce their capital gains tax liabilities. Id. An additional benefit comes
from the non-taxation of net imputed rental - "the difference between the income they could
receive from renting their homes and the total costs of homeownership." Id.
9. "By lowering the after-tax cost of homeownership, the tax provisions tend to shift resources
into housing at the expense of other capital assets, and into the production of owner-occupied
housing rather than rental housing." Id. at xii.
10. "The federal government spends more than $150 billion each year to subsidize homeown-
ership." TAX POLICY CENTER, THE TAX POLICY BRIEFING BOOK, (2008), http://www.taxpolicy
center.orgbriefing-booklkey-elements/homeownership/incentives.cfm.
11. "These tax provisions reduce the after-tax costs of acquiring, owning, and selling a home."
Congressional Budget Office, supra note 8, at xii. But see THE TAX POLICY BRIEFING BOOK,
supra note 10 ("The bulk of the subsidies go to middle- and upper-income households who
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has commonly used homeownership figures as a litmus test for the
nation's economic health. 12 Unfortunately, the rampant increase in
homeownership helped create the current economic crisis. Washing-
ton's quest to inflate the number of homeowners deflated the
economy.
The real estate market entered a prolonged boom during the early
part of this decade. 13 While speculative investors powered much of
this market boom, 14 first-time buyers also had an impact. 15 With the
annual appreciation rate of real estate reaching double digits, an un-
precedented number of Americans felt the need to become homeown-
ers. 16 The government successfully made homeownership more
accessible, but it left no guardrails to keep people from sliding into
debt.
Traps lay in wait for unsuspecting buyers. Lenders accepted mort-
gages without down payments-even from mortgagors unable to
make their first premium payments. Banks advised mortgagors to take
would likely own their homes anyway; thus, these subsidies simply facilitate the consumption of
more housing.").
12. See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (2004) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html) ("The pace of economic
growth in the third quarter of 2003 was the fastest in nearly 20 years; new home construction, the
highest in almost 20 years; home ownership rates, the highest ever."). See also The White House,
President George W. Bush, Record of Achievement, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/
achievement/chap7.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). ("The US homeownership rate reached a
record 69.2 percent in the second quarter of 2004. The number of homeowners in the United
States reached 73.4 million, the most ever. And for the first time, the majority of minority Amer-
icans own their own homes.").
13. A healthy economy and low interest rates helped push up real estate values across the
country in the early 2000s. As values rose, the risk of default declined, since borrowers could tap
home-equity lines of credit. That reduced risk appealed to lenders, which in turn offered loans to
even more buyers, which added to the demand and further increased real estate prices. Veena
Trehan, The Mortgage Market: What Happened?, NPR, Apr. 26, 2007. As prices skyrocketed,
speculators entered the market, driving the cycle even further. Id. See also U.S. CENSUS Bu-
REAU, CENSUS BUREAU DATA ON NEW HOME PRICES, http://www.housingbubblebust.com/
HsgData/CB/New/Sales[Prices.html.
14. "America was awash in a stark, raving frenzy that looked every bit as crazy as dot-com
stocks." Eugenia Levenson, Lowering the Boom? Speculators Gone Mild, FORTUNE, Mar. 15,
2006; "1 worry about a big fall because prices today are being supported by a speculative fever."
Maria Bartiromo, Jitters on the Home Front, Bus. WK., Mar. 6, 2006.
15. The White House, President George W. Bush, Fact Sheet: Dismantling the Barriers to
Home Ownership, http:I/www.whitehouse.govlnews/releases/200403/20040326-5.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 10, 2008).
16. "[W]hen faced with the prospect of having to put off owning a home, buyers have been
looking for any way to get in, especially when it means (they hope) a chance to ride the double-
digit gains that homeowners have been racking up." Cybele Weisser, Crazy Loans: Is This How
The Boom Ends?, MONEY MAGAZINE, Sept. 16, 2005.
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out secondary loans to make payments on their primary loans.1 7
Banks also offered teaser rates on adjustable rate mortgages18 and
commonly included prepayment penalties. 19
These tactics worked. Millions of Americans entered into adjustable
rate mortgages ("ARMs"). 20 ARMs have been a staple of the mort-
gage industry for years, although borrowers traditionally balked when
offered them.21 During the housing boom, the fear of missing an op-
portunity for wealth creation supplanted this prudence.
Americans proved open to other forms of creative financing, and
lenders and buyers threw caution to the wind. For example, lenders
offered piggyback loans,22 which enabled borrowers to purchase
homes they could not afford. 23 It also became common for loan agents
to counsel buyers into purchasing property without a down payment.
Banks conducted little due diligence24 and borrowers accepted preda-
17. "Don't have the money to pay [the teaser]?... Take a home-equity loan against your new
house to meet those minimal payments." James J. Cramer, Bloody and Bloodier, N.Y. MAGA-
ZINE, Aug. 13, 2007.
18. Adjustable rate mortgages ("ARMs") "are loans whose interest rates adjust up or down
periodically. The initial rate is typically fixed for a period of two or three years. The benefit is
that the starter rates [in the first few years] are lower for ARMs than for traditional, fixed-rate
mortgages." Trehan, supra note 13.
19. Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007.
20. "Nearly 25% of mortgages - 10 million - carry adjustable interest rates. And most of them
went to people with subpar credit ratings who accepted higher interest rates." Noelle Knox,
Some Homeowners Struggle, USA TODAY, Apr. 3, 2006.
21. "With an ARM, the borrower, not the lender, shoulders the risk that inflation (and thus,
interest rates) will kick up." Ira Carnahan, Mortgage Tricks, FORBES, June 9, 2003. In theory, the
risk should be diminished by economic norms: "if interest rates shoot up, inflation should adjust
salaries up too." Id. The truth, of course, is not so simple. See Nell Henderson, Pay Lags Behind
Inflation, WASH. POST, July 30, 2005.
22. "Piggyback loans get their name from a second mortgage that is 'piggybacked' onto a first
mortgage to compensate for buyers unable to come up with a larger down payment or any at
all." Broderick Perkins, Piggyback Loan Growth Poses Mortgage System Risk, REALTY TIMES,
July 13, 2005.
23. "42 percent of home purchase mortgage loan dollars involved piggyback loans during the
first half of 2004, more than double the level in 2001." Id. Piggyback loans contribute to housing
market bubbles, when used in excess to enable homebuyers to purchase homes they cannot
afford. Id.
24. "In both 2006 and 2007, well over 40 percent of subprime borrowers were awarded mort-
gages with either little or no documentation of their ability to pay." Les Christie, Subprime loans
defaulting even before resets, CNN MONEY, Feb. 20, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/20/
realestate/loansjfailing-pre-resets/index.htm?postversion=200802201. "With these so-called
'liar loans,' borrowers did not have to show proof of either earnings or assets." Id. "[Simall down
payments were combined with other risk factors, such as a lack of documentation of sufficient
income to make the required loan payments." Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of Gover-
nors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Statement at the Independent Community Bankers of America
Annual Convention, Orlando, Florida (Mar. 4, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.feder-
alreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bemanke2008O3O4a.htm).
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tory loans.25 Families and investors were drawn by the possibility of
huge returns. Many lenders, however, had a different objective.
These lenders used a creative financing technique called asset
securitization26 to pool their mortgage loans, typically through an in-
termediary, and then issue securities representing claims on the princi-
pal and interest payments made by the borrowers on the loans in the
pool. 27 However, not all debt is equal. The creditworthiness of the
underlying obligor impacts the value of the debt, and the least
creditworthy obligors received what are known as "subprime mort-
gages."'28 As the lenders' standards continued to fall, the amount of
securitized mortgages backed by non-creditworthy borrowers rose.
29
Since the actual mortgages were secured by real estate, the lenders
and debt-investors were insulated from risk so long as the real estate
market continued to boom.30 If borrowers defaulted on their loans,
the assets securing those loans could be resold to recoup investors'
losses. Unfortunately, the sharp increase in housing prices is now un-
derstood as a massive price bubble.3' The bubble has burst.32
25. "Predatory lending is rooted in deceptive and in some cases illegal practices to coerce
borrowers into unfavorable mortgage agreements." ROBERTO G. QUERCIA, MICHAEL A.
STEGMAN & WALTER R. DAVIS, THE IMPACr OF PREDATORY LOAN TERMS ON SUBPRIME FORE-
CLOSURES: THE SPECIAL CASE OF PREPAYMENT PENALTIES AND BALLOON PAYMENTS 4 (Ctr.
for Cmty. Capitalism Kenan Inst. for Private Enter. Univ. of N. Carolina at Chapel Hill ed.,
2005), available at http://www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/assets/documents/foreclosurepaper.pdf.
Common features of predatory loans include, "lengthy and costly prepayment penalties that
prevent borrowers from refinancing when interest rates fall." Id.
26. Assets such as credit cards, automobile loans and home equity loans are pack-
aged as the collateral for intermediate-term... securities and sold in the public markets
or as private placements.... [T]hese securities now trade at interest-rate spreads over
Treasury bills that make them a relatively low-cost source of funding for many
companies.
Philip L. Zweig, Asset-Backed Securities, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2008).
27. Jeffrey A. Lenobel & Robert S. Nash, Financing Demystified: How Mortgage-Backed Se-
curities Are Assembled and Sold, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1998.
28. "Subprime mortgages are extended to applicants deemed the least creditworthy because
of low credit scores or uncertain income prospects, both of which reflect the highest default risk
and warrant the highest interest rates." Danielle DiMartino & John v. Duca, The Rise and Fall of
Subprime Mortgages, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, Vol. 2, No. 11, Nov. 2007.
29. "As late as 2003, subprime loans accounted for only 8.5 percent of the value of mortgages
issued in this country. In 2005 and 2006, the peak years of the housing bubble, subprime was 20
percent of the total." Krugman, supra note 2.
30. "The current subprime mortgage market was built on the belief that double digit gains in
home appreciation would continue forever." Patrick Madigan, Overview of the Subprime Fore-
closure Crisis 3 (2007), http://www.iowa.gov/government/ag/latest-news/releases/sept_2007/
Foreclosure-analysis.pdf.
31. In economic terms, a "bubble" is trade in high volumes at prices that are considerably at
variance from intrinsic values. Ronald R. King, et al., The Robustness of Bubbles and Crashes in
Experimental Stock Markets, NONLINEAR DYNAMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS (1993);
"[The housing] boom is now the mother of all bubbles - in sheer volume, if not in degrees of
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Mortgage delinquencies increased substantially in 2005,33 with lend-
ers initiating 641,000 foreclosures. 34 That number grew to almost
971,000 in 200635 and 1.5 million in 2007.36 The majority of these fore-
closures were subprime mortgages. 37 The mortgage holders found
themselves far more exposed than they had anticipated 38 because
much of the property securing the mortgages was worth less than the
principal on the notes.39 Meanwhile, ARMs are continuing to reset 40
at ever-higher rates,41 leading to fresh waves of defaults.42 Thus while
the full impact of the price bubble burst may not be known for some
time,43 it has already wracked the world markets.44 The fallout will
cause the middle-class to suffer tremendously. 45
speculative madness." Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, No Mercy Now, No Bail-out Later, TELE-
GRAPH, Mar. 23, 2006.
32. "It's now conventional wisdom that a housing bubble has burst.... Housing peaked in
2005. By early 2006 it was widely recognized the boom was likely over, and by mid-2006 it was
beyond question." Justin Lahart, Egg Cracks Differ in Housing, Finance Shells, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 24, 2007.
33. Bernanke, supra note 24.
34. Foreclosures Increase at 51 Percent Nationwide, EAST BAY BUSINESS TIMES, Jan. 8, 2007,
http://eastbay.bizjournals.com/eastbay/stories/2007/01/08/daily8.html.
35. Id.
36. Bernanke, supra note 24.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. One national house price index, "which rose at close to a double-digit pace from 2000
through 2005, has slowed to show only small gains for the past several quarters, and some areas
are seeing outright price declines." Governor Randall S. Kroszner, Remarks at the Consumer
Bankers Association 2007 Fair Lending Conference, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 5, 2007) (transcript
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner20071105a.htm).
40. "About $460 billion worth of adjustable mortgages are scheduled to reset [throughout
2008], raising minimum payments for borrowers ... About $190 billion in subprime adjustable
mortgages are slated to reset this year." Sharon L. Lynch, U.S. Home Foreclosures Jump 90% as
Mortgages Reset, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601
087&sid=azx0LzcT19ao&refer=home.
41. The Federal Reserve Board estimates that the interest rate on a typical subprime ARM
slated to reset in Spring, 2008, will increase to about 9.25% from just above 8%, raising the
monthly payment by more than 10%, to $1,500 on average. Bernanke, supra note 24.
42. "Banks may be forced to resell as many as 1 million foreclosed properties this year, adding
to a glut of inventory and forcing prices down even further." Lynch, supra note 40.
43. Already, the subprime mortgage crisis has caused financial losses in excess of $300 billion.
The figure will continue to rise sharply. Nouriel Roubini, A Sobering 12-Step Scenario, FIN. WK.,
Feb. 25, 2008.
44. Id.
45. Home prices are expected to fall between 20% and 30% from their peak, impacting the
tens of millions of Americans who avoided investing in real estate during the boom. It is likely
that the damage will spread from the residential markets to the commercial markets, adding
additional strain to the regional and national banks that are heavily exposed to these mortgages.
If bank losses grow, that would add to the recession and could lead to a wave of corporate
defaults. Id.
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Foreclosures follow the wave of defaults. "For communities, fore-
closed homes frequently remain vacant for prolonged period of time
[sic], during which they may be poorly maintained. Foreclosed homes
are often a primary source of neighborhood instability in terms of de-
pressed property values and increased crime. '46 At a national level,
the rise in foreclosures will add to the glut of unsold property, already
at more than two million units, and further depress prices.47
It is difficult to address the problems associated with subprime lend-
ing. Subprime lending is an important element of the financial system
because it offers credit to high-risk borrowers who might otherwise be
unable to obtain financing.48 However, the subprime lending industry
appears to be more susceptible to abusive lending practices than the
prime market.49
B. The Promise and Problems of Prepayment Provisions
For years, the mortgage industry has used teasers and adjustable
rates to attract borrowers. Under traditional contract principles, these
techniques likely withstand judicial scrutiny.50 Prepayment provisions,
however, often involve penalties intended to secure performance, and
such penalty provisions are unenforceable under traditional contract
law.51
Prepayment provisions are contractual terms permitting a mortga-
gor to pay the outstanding principal on a loan prior to the contractual
46. JOINT U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, TASK FORCE ON
PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 51 (2000), http://
www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf (hereinafter "Task Force").
47. Bernanke, supra note 24.
48. Task Force, supra note 46.
49. "A subprime borrower may have few financial options available or less information on
loan terms and conditions and less opportunity to shop for the best terms and conditions availa-
ble." Id.
50. Under the fundamental principles of freedom of contract, parties have a broad right to
enforce contractual provisions that are not unconscionable, illegal, or violative of public policy.
SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON TME LAW OF CoNTRACTS Vol. 24
§ 65:1, at 213-15 (4th ed. 1993) (hereinafter "WILLISTON"). There is nothing per se illegal or
unconscionable about introductory or variable rates. Id. But see Thomas J. Miller, Attorney
General of Iowa, Opening Statement at the Board of Governors Federal Reserve System Public
Hearing Pursuant to Section 158 of the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994
(June 14, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2007/August/
20070823/OP-1288/OP-128896l.pdf). (providing "[r]equiring lenders to stop underwriting
loans based on the temporary and artificially low teaser rate will help consumers by encouraging
sustainable homeownership.")
51. "The central objective behind the system of contract remedies is compensatory, not puni-
tive. Punishment of a promisor for having broken his promise has no justification on ... eco-
nomic grounds... and a term providing such a penalty is unenforceable on grounds of public
policy." WILLISTON, supra note 50, at 226.
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date of maturity. 52 The financial status of a mortgagor may change
significantly during the life of his or her mortgage, and prepayment
provisions provide mortgagors a way out of their loan. This can be
advantageous for a number of reasons. For example, the mortgagor
may come into money and wish to own his property outright. A mort-
gagor may need to refinance in the event of financial hardship or in-
terest rates may fall, creating a strong incentive to refinance. 53 For
mortgagees, prepayment creates an undesirable risk. The mortgagee
has an interest in receiving the stream of interest payments on the
outstanding principal. 54 Thus, mortgagees require the payment of
some premium 55 in order for a mortgagor to prepay the principal. 56 In
theory, prepayment provisions are mutually advantageous. 57 In prac-
tice, however, prepayment provisions are often abused. Of the mort-
gages created during the recent real estate boom, tens of millions
contained prepayment provisions handcuffing the mortgagor to the
loan through its date of maturity. 5
Prepayment provisions come in a variety of forms.59 One form is a
flat-fee clause. 60 A flat-fee clause fixes a number, either a dollar
amount or a percentage of the loan balance, as the price of payment.61
Another prepayment form is a declining percentage clause, often
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: (MORTGAGES) § 6.2 (1997).
53. If the mortgagor has the opportunity to refinance at a more attractive rate, the mortgagor
may find it advantageous to prepay the existing debt, even if he must also pay a prepayment fee.
Id. at 404.
54. This represents the mortgagee's expectancy interest. "The expectancy interest refers to the
fulfillment of an aggrieved party's expectancy of gain if the bargain to which he was a party had
been carried out and performed." JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 6.1, at 27
(2d ed. 2006).
55. "About 70 percent of subprime loans have costly prepayment penalties that trap borrow-
ers ... and ... keep borrowers from shopping for a better deal." Geraldine Fabrikant, A Home
Loan Trap, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2007.
56. Prepayment need not always be in one lump sum. Mortgagees will often refer to a "pre-
payment risk." This risk can be defined as follows: "As prepayments occur, the amount of princi-
pal retained in the bond declines faster than what otherwise may be expected - thereby
shortening the average life of the bond by returning principal." Fidelity Investments, Mortgage-
Backed Securities: Product Overview, http://personal.fidelity.comlproducts/fixedincome/pombs.
shtml.
57. The benefits to the lender are set out above. Lenders argue that the benefits to borrowers
are lower monthly payments, as well as broader availability of loans. Fabrikant, supra note 55.
58. According to the Center for Responsible Lending, more than two-thirds of the adjustable
rate loans carried prepayment penalties. Id. Unsurprisingly, those loans also carried low teaser
interest rates, which rose sharply over time. Id.
59. Dale A. Whitman, Mortgage Prepayment Clauses: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 40
UCLA L. REV. 851, 869-71 (1993).
60. Id. at 870.
61. Id.
THE ENFORCEABLE PREPAYMENT PENALTY
found in commercial mortgages, 62 which permits prepayment if the
borrower pays a fee defined as a declining percentage of the loan bal-
ance over time.63 A declining percentage clause often prohibits pre-
payment for a limited period of time.64 A third form of prepayment
involves a yield-maintenance clause, 65 which attempts to measure, or
at least approximate, a lender's actual damage flowing from prepay-
ment. 66 A rudimentary yield-maintenance clause might fix a fee as the
difference between the loan interest rate and the then-current yield on
U.S. Treasury notes closest in maturity to the remaining loan term,
multiplied by the loan balance and then by the number of years re-
maining on the loan term. 67
It can be difficult for courts to determine when a provision is valid
and when it is a penalty.68 In 2006, the Northern District of Illinois
crafted an intelligible test for prepayment provisions seeking to sepa-
rate the enforceable from the unenforceable. 69 The court's analysis
was grounded in contract principles and affected all lending practices
in the state of Illinois. 70
This paper: (1) considers the theoretical and legal underpinnings of
prepayment provisions; (2) analyzes the Northern District decision
and legacy; and (3) contemplates the future of prepayment provisions.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Whitman, supra note 59, at 870-71.
65. Id. at 871. They are called "yield maintenance" because they are designed to give the
lender the economic equivalent of the yield it would have earned if the loan had remained in
place for its full term. Id.
66. "Yield maintenance formulas are calculated to cover the lender's reinvestment loss when
prepaid loans bear above-market rates." George Lefcoe, Yield Maintenance and Defeasance:
Two Distinct Paths to Commercial Mortgage Prepayment, 28 REAL EST. L.J. 202 (2000).
67. Whitman, supra note 59, at 871.
68. "A subtle distinction, not always observed, exists between clauses that merely induce per-
formance and those that operate coercively; and the failure to observe it ... will result in the
invalidation of clauses that ought ... to be enforced." WILLISTON, supra note 50, at 2.
69. River E. Plaza, L.L.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., No. 03-C-4354, 2006 WL 2787483
(N.D. I11. Sept. 22, 2006).
70. Id.
2008]
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III. THE LAW OF PREPAYMENT
The general rule, both in Illinois7l and nationally,72 is that borrow-
ers do not have an absolute right to prepay a loan. 73 Nevertheless,
borrowers often insist upon the inclusion of prepayment provisions in
their lending agreements.74 The nation's largest residential lenders
prioritize the inclusion of these provisions in all loans issued.75
Prepayment provisions either make refinancing impossible to ob-
tain for many mortgagors 76 or offset the financial benefit that would
otherwise accrue to the mortgagor from refinancing. 77 Recognizing
the potential abuse of prepayment provisions, the Illinois legislature
enacted the Illinois Interest Act 78 to provide a modicum of protection
to certain residential mortgagors. However, the Interest Act only pro-
hibits prepayment penalties for residential mortgages in which the
rate of interest exceeds eight percent per annum. 79 The efficacy of the
Interest Act is rather limited when interest rates are at or near historic
lows. Thus in an age of record-low interest rates,80 the Act's protec-
tions might generously be described as paltry.
71. It is settled law in Illinois that a borrower has no absolute right to prepay a loan. Latimer
v. Grundy County Nat'l Bank, 239 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 1001 (3d Dist. 1993).
72. "At common law... the mortgagor may not exercise his or her right to redemption before
maturity. Thus, in the absence of a prepayment clause, a mortgagor generally has no right to
insist that the mortgagee accept payment prior to the date of maturity." 55 AM. JUR. 2 D Mort-
gages § 345 (2006).
73. [T]he majority rule in this country is, and for a long time has been, that, absent
special agreement, the mortgagor in an unregulated transaction who promises to repay
the loan, in installments at specified times or at a specified date, does not have a right
to compel the creditor to accept prepayment.
Promenade Towers Mut. Hous. Corp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 587 A.2d 1377, 1379 (Md. 1991).
74. Commercial borrowers, in particular, place an emphasis upon the inclusion of such provi-
sions - no surprise perhaps, given that many such borrowers are relatively sophisticated and
have the advice of counsel. Yet these sophisticated borrowers often find themselves in a situation
similar to residential borrowers. It may be that commercial lenders, given their greater access to
resources and lobbyists, will be the ones to bring pressure upon Congress to reform the lending
industry.
75. Countrywide Financial Corporation created incentives for its sales force to include such
provisions. According to one mortgage sales representative affiliated with Countrywide, "adding
a three-year prepayment penalty to a loan would generate an extra 1 percent of the loan's value
in a commission." Morgenson, supra note 19.
76. According to the Acorn Financial Justice Center, lenders refer to the practice of including
prepayment provisions in their loans as "closing the back door" by making it too costly for
borrowers to get out of loans with rising rates. Fabrikant, supra note 55.
77. Id.
78. 815 ILCS 205/4(2)(a) (West 2007).
79. Id.
80. For instance, in January 2008, the average rate for a fixed-rate 30-year mortgage was
5.68%. Sandra Block, Low Mortgage Rates Make Refinancing Attractive, USA TODAY, Feb. 2,
2008, available at, http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/columnist/block/2008-02-04-refinancing
_N.htm.
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The issues raised by subprime loans and prepayment provisions are
closely intertwined.81 Prepayment provisions are distinct characteris-
tics of subprime loans. 82 Over the past decade, the percentage of sub-
prime loans with prepayment provisions increased from fifty to
seventy percent.83 In the prime market, by contrast, only about two
percent of home loans carried similar prepayment provisions. 84 As a
practical matter, prepayment provisions extend the average life of a
mortgage. 85 For an average subprime loan, a prepayment provision
reduces the rate of prepayment by roughly ten percent over the life of
the prepayment term.86
Congress has belatedly grasped the extent of the problem. Accord-
ing to the Joint Economic Committee,87 nearly two million subprime
borrowers will lose their homes to foreclosure before the end of 2009,
at an estimated cost of roughly seventy-one billion dollars in housing
wealth.88 Yet some of this loss could be mitigated if homeowners had
the opportunity to refinance their mortgages, an opportunity often
foreclosed by prepayment provisions.8 9 While the judiciary has the
power to provide homeowners with relief from prepayment penalties,
Congress can provide a uniform solution.
81. Quercia, supra note 27, at 7.
82. Id.
83. A Snapshot of the Subprime Market, THE CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LEARNING, Nov. 27,
2007, http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/mortgage/quick-references/a-snapshot-of-the-
subprime.html.
84. Id.
85. According to the Center for Community Capitalism:
Prepayment penalties . . . slow down the repayment of the outstanding principal, in-
creasing the likelihood that borrowers may experience negative equity in the event of a
downturn in the market. In addition, prepayment penalties can reduce the refinancing
and other choices available to borrowers when confronted with a crisis, or of refinanc-
ing into a lower cost prime loan as a result of improving their credit record, making the
option to default more desirable.
QUERCIA, supra note 25, at 8.
86. QUERCIA, supra note 25, at 7.
87. "The Joint Economic Committee is a bicameral Congressional Committee composed of
ten members from each the Senate and the House of Representatives.... Its main purpose is to
make a continuing study of matters relating to the US economy. The committee holds hearings,
performs research and advises members of Congress." Committee Background, U.S. CONGRESS:
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, http://jec.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=About.Committee
Background.
88. Bloomberg, Subprime Crisis Toll Tabbed at $71 Billion, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 26, 2007,
available at, http://www.boston.com/realestate/news/articles/2007/10/26/subprime-crisis-toll_
tabbed-at_71b/.
89. According to Senator Christopher J. Dodd, "About 70% of subprime loans have costly
prepayment penalties that trap borrowers in high-cost mortgages, mortgages that strip wealth
rather than build it." Fabrikant, supra note 55.
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Whatever response Congress crafts, it will inevitably leave some un-
happy. Despite the abusive lending practices during the real estate
boom, Congress should think twice before banning all prepayment
provisions. The societal costs of prepayment provisions are great, but
the costs associated with the outright removal of all prepayment pro-
visions might be even greater. 90 Prepayment provisions, at least in the-
ory, help ensure a robust lending industry by protecting both
borrowers and lenders from interest rate fluctuations. Moreover, lend-
ers need some margin to cover their losses or the cost of borrowing
will continue to rise.
Prepayment may . . . result in further losses [to the lender], such as
the administrative and legal costs of making a new loan .... and in
some cases additional tax liability. Moreover, the mortgagee may be
forced to place the prepaid funds temporarily in a relatively low-
yielding short-term investment while awaiting another suitable
mortgage-lending opportunity.91
As one court explained the problem:
The lender has committed itself to leave its funds outstanding for a
fixed period at a given interest yield, and to suffer the market rate
risk inherent in this position. .. From the lender's viewpoint, a pre-
payment is a derogation of the right to earn the agreed yield for the
full term even if extrinsic rates drop. In other words, the borrower
breaches its obligation to keep the loan in effect for its full term. 92
The problem is not the existence of prepayment provisions. Rather,
the problem is the lending industry's use of abusive provisions, which
are intended only to secure performance.
Until the federal government acts, the task of sorting out which pre-
payment provisions should be enforced falls on the courts and state
legislatures.
IV. SOCIAL UTILITY AND UNCERTAINTY
Courts have traditionally recognized that bargained-for prepayment
provisions serve legitimate business purposes and generally should be
enforced. 93 The courts should not provide equitable relief from all
90. "Even when prepayment penalties are present, most borrowers can still prepay up to 20
percent of the original loan amount in any 12-month period without incurring penalties."
QUERCIA, supra note 25, at 7 n.8.
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 6.2 (1997).
92. Whitman, supra note 59, at 871-72.
93. W. Raleigh Group v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 809 F. Supp. 384,388 (E.D.N.C. 1992). See
also Prentice v. UDC Advisory Servs., Inc., 648 N.E.2d 146, 153 (Il. App. Ct. 1995) (finding that
"the sanctity of a promise, certainty in the marketplace and the expectation of parties, are cor-
nerstones of contract law."); Delcon Group, Inc. v. N. Trust Corp., 543 N.E.2d 595, 605 (Ill. App.
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prepayment provisions, 94 only those that operate as de facto penalties.
Lenders cannot predict with absolute certainty whether future interest
rates will rise or fall. With every mortgage loan comes the risk of pre-
payment and consequent loss of yield. 95 Prepayment fees shift the risk
of loss associated with prepayment from the mortgagor to the mortga-
gee. In substance, the clause compels a mortgagee to bear that loss,
however great it may be, in return for the receipt of the fee stated in
the clause. 96
However, prepayment penalties may also bestow benefits upon bor-
rowers as well as lenders. According to Kurt Pfotenhauer, senior vice-
president for government affairs at the Mortgage Bankers Association
("MBA"), "You want to give pause before banning prepayment pen-
alties.... They save consumers' money by lowering their rates. '97 The
MBA supports a three-year limitation on prepayment penalties for all
mortgages. 98 A more significant restriction or outright prohibition on
prepayment penalties could increase rates to borrowers and eliminate
some financing options for consumers. 99
A developing body of literature argues the deference traditionally
paid to prepayment penalties was misplaced.100 The Center for Re-
sponsible Lending recently concluded "prepayment penalties resulted
in no statistically [significant] differences in interest rates."'1 1 This
Ct. 1989) (finding that "a party to a contract has a certain and enforceable expectation of receiv-
ing the benefits of the contract.").
94. "A freely-bargained prepayment fee clause ought to be enforced against the borrower
who makes a voluntary prepayment, irrespective of the amount of money that the lender's clause
demands." Whitman, supra note 59, at 890.
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 6.2 (1997).
96. Id.
97. Fabrikant, supra note 57.
98. MBA Encourages Federal Reserve To Use HOEPA Authority "Surgically And In A
Targeted Manner," MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSoCIATION, Aug. 15, 2007, http://www.mortgage
bankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/56183.htm. The MBA also expects that the market will
conform to the recent subprime statement requiring prepayment penalties not extend beyond
the reset period of hybrid ARMs and allow borrowers a period of up to sixty days prior to the
initial ARM reset to avoid a prepayment penalty. Id.
99. Peter G. Miller, How To End Lethal Prepayment Penalties, REALTYTRAC, Oct. 11, 2007.
100. According to Senator Christopher J. Dodd:
Prepayment penalties unfairly trap subprime borrowers in expensive subprime mort-
gages. These penalties make it cost-prohibitive to refinance into better loans, or strip
out equity when the penalty is paid. Studies ... show that interest rates on subprime
loans are no lower for loans with prepayment penalties - the ostensible rationale for
these fees - than for loans without these penalties.
Dodd Introduces Legislation to Protect American Homeownership, CHRIS DODD UNITED STATES
SENATOR FOR CONNEcrIcuT, Dec. 12. 2007, http://dodd.senate.gov/index.php?qN-de/4167.
101. Federal Reserve Board, Comments on Proposed Interagency Statement on Subprime
Mortgage Lending, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, May 7, 2007, http://www.responsible
lending.org/policy/regulators/comments.html.
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finding stands in stark contrast to the justification commonly offered
for prepayment penalties.
Lenders often claim prepayment penalties are irrelevant for bor-
rowers with hybrid ARMs because the penalties typically remain in
effect only for the duration of the teaser rate period.10 2 This, however,
puts borrowers in the perverse situation of choosing to refinance prior
to reset-when their current rates are as low as they will ever be-and
incurring a prepayment fee or defaulting on the post-reset payment.'0 3
Removing prepayment provisions altogether would decrease activ-
ity in the secondary debt market,10 4 impacting the willingness and
ability of lenders to engage in high-volume lending. 0 5 The Depart-
ment of the Treasury has expressed concern about this inhibition.10 6
While prepayment provisions are generally enforceable, exceptions
exist for unconscionable clauses and those violating the duty of good
faith and fair dealing. However, demonstrating a clause is unconscion-
able is complicated. For instance, courts routinely enforce prepayment
provisions calling for "extremely large fee[s], ''10 7 treating such fees as
the functional equivalent of lock-in clauses. 08 Courts routinely en-
force lock-in clauses which prohibit prepayment entirely.'0 9
Some courts have subjected prepayment provisions to a liquidated
damages analysis. 110 A liquidated damages clause sets, or liquidates,
damages at a particular amount."1 Parties use such clauses to deter-
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. While the unbridled securitization of debt and issuance on the public markets caused
the current crisis, any decision that would impact the value of the securities should be taken into
consideration, notwithstanding the current realities of the marketplace.
105. Mortgage companies introduced prepayment penalties on mortgage loans to satiate the
concerns of the investors purchasing securities on the secondary mortgage market. Since prepay-
ment penalties assure the investor some compensation if the loan is paid off early, investors are
willing to accept lower returns on their investment. David C. Dopp, Some Other Things You
Should Know About Prepayment Penalties, INTEREST.COM, 2003 http://mortgages.interest.com/
content/firsttime/pers-ddl.asp.
106. "Significant restrictions or prohibitions of such penalties in the high-cost loan market
could serve to inhibit the flow of credit to these borrowers, at least temporarily, by forcing the
secondary market to retool its securitization strategies ...." Task Force, supra note 46, at 95.
107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 6.2 (1997).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. The reason many courts analyzing prepayment provisions apply a liquidated damages
analysis might be that liquidated damages are often only effectuated by a breach, which, in and
of itself becomes the subject of litigation; and an analysis of the reasonableness of a supposed
'liquidated damages' clause takes courts down a less-convoluted path than that presented by
alternatives.
111. David S. Steuer, Drafting Corporate Agreements 2008: A Litigator's Perspective on the
Drafting of Commercial Contracts, 1642 PLI/CoRP 353, 365 (2008).
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mine the damage amount due in the event of a breach. 12 There is
only a smattering of Illinois case law addressing prepayment provi-
sions.113 The Illinois Supreme Court has not established when a pre-
payment provision ought to be enforced or the circumstances, if any,
in which voluntary prepayment provisions should be treated as liqui-
dated damages.11 4
The law of liquidated damages is substantially more developed than
the law of prepayment provisions. There are clear rules governing
when a court should find such provisions unenforceable." 5 Under Illi-
nois law, a liquidated damages provision will be enforced if it meets
the test set out in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.1 16 Illinois
courts look at the following three elements to determine whether the
provisions meet the Restatement test:
(1) the parties [must have] intended to agree in advance to the set-
tlement of damages that might arise from the breach; (2) the
amount of liquidated damages was reasonable at the time of con-
tracting, bearing some relation to the damages which might be sus-
tained; and (3) actual damages would be uncertain in amount and
difficult to prove. 117
Furthermore, it is well-settled in Illinois that reasonable liquidated
damages provisions are enforceable, while terms fixing unreasonably
large liquidated damages awards are unreasonable. 1 8 Courts will look
to the substance of an agreement to determine whether the parties
wrapped a penalty in the cloth of liquidated damages. 119 When deter-
mining whether actual damages would be uncertain in amount and
difficult to prove, courts look at the circumstances surrounding the
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. a (1981).
113. In re AE Hotel Venture, 321 B.R. 209, 219 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005).
114. River E. Plaza, L.L.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., No. 03-C-4354, 2006 WL
2787483, at *1 (N.D. I11. Sept. 22, 2006).
115. Jameson Realty Group v. Kostiner, 813 N.E.2d 1124, 1130 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
116. Id. ("Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at
an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach
and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty." (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981)).
117. Jameson Realty Group, 813 N.E.2d at 1130 (quoting Med+Plus Neck & Back Pain Ctr.,
S.C. v. Noffsinger, 726 N.E.2d 687 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)).
118. Id.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. c (1981) ("Neither the parties' actual
intent as to its validity nor the characterization of the term as one for liquidated damages or a
penalty is significant in determining whether the term is valid. Sometimes parties attempt to
disguise a provision for a penalty.... [A] court will look to the substance of the agreement to
determine whether this is the case or whether the parties have attempted to disguise a provision
for a penalty that is unenforceable under this Section.").
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agreement. 120 Additionally, the provision must specify the breach and
the consequent amount of damages; it may not serve merely as a
threat or a means to punish nonperformance. 12
Prepayment provisions are analogous to liquidated damages provi-
sions. When courts consider whether to enforce a liquidated damages
provision, they look first to whether the parties agreed in advance to a
settlement of damages. This element is present in all prepayment pro-
visions.' 2 2 Courts next consider whether the provision bears any rela-
tion to the actual damages that might be sustained. This element is
also present in all prepayment provisions. 123 Finally, courts consider
the degree of difficulty and uncertainty in calculating the actual
amount of damages at the time of contracting. This difficulty and un-
certainty is one of the primary reasons that lenders insist upon prepay-
ment fees. Actual damages are both difficult and costly to calculate.12 4
The test for whether to enforce liquidated damages provisions applies
aptly to prepayment provisions.
V. A FEDERAL COURT TAKES A STAND
The Northern District of Illinois recently declared a prepayment
provision unenforceable. 125 The case arose out of a 1999 commercial
loan between the Variable Life Insurance Company ("VALIC") and
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. b (1981) ("[T]he amount fixed is
reasonable to the extent that it approximates the loss anticipated at the time of making the
contract, even though it may not approximate the actual loss .... The greater the difficulty
either of proving that loss has occurred or of establishing its amount with the requisite certainty
.... the easier it is to show that the amount fixed is reasonable .... A determination whether
the amount fixed is a penalty turns on a combination of these two factors. If the difficulty of
proof of loss is great, considerable latitude is allowed in the approximation of anticipated or
actual harm. If, on the other hand, the difficulty of proof is slight, less latitude is allowed in that
approximation.").
121. Jameson Realty Group, 813 N.E.2d at 1131 (citing Med+Plus Neck & Back Pain Center,
S.C. v. Noffsinger, 726 N.E.2d 687, 693 (Il1. App. Ct. 2000)).
122. Whitman, supra note 61, at 860 ("Both lender and borrower recognize at the time of
contracting that in the event the borrower pays the loan prior to maturity, the lender may suffer
damage as a consequence.").
123. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 6.2 cmt. c (1997) ("Since the
amount of the loss depends largely on the movement of interest rates and cannot be predicted in
advance of the actual prepayment, the amount of the fee may, as with other forms of insurance,
be greater or smaller than the actual loss. The fee clause may also be viewed as analogous to a
liquidation of damages.") (emphasis added).
124. Whitman, supra note 59, at 873 ("[T]he core of the damage that lenders suffer from
prepayment - the loss of an advantageous interest rate - is easy to measure. But the peripheral
elements, such as the cost of relending the funds and the impact on the lender's tax liability, may
be much more difficult to assess. Only after an expensive and time-consuming trial can a jury be
expected to determine these damages.").
125. River E. Plaza, L.L.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., No. 03-C-4354, 2006 WL
2787483, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2006).
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the predecessor of River East Plaza, L.L.C. ("River East"). 126 The
loan was in the form of a first mortgage, in the amount of $12.7 mil-
lion with a twenty-year term, twenty-five year amortization, and a
fixed interest rate of 8.02%.127 The loan agreement, which VALIC
drafted, included a prepayment provision. The relevant portion of the
provision stated the amount due at prepayment was the greater of an
amount calculated as set forth in paragraphs (1) or (2) (as applicable),
below:
(1) at the time of receipt by [Defendant] of the Notice, the differ-
ence between (a) the then present value of all unpaid installments
of principal and interest due and payable under this Note, calcu-
lated from the date of the proposed prepayment to the Maturity
Date, discounted at the "Reinvestment Rate" (as hereinafter de-
fined) and (b) the outstanding principal balance under this Note on
the date of the proposed prepayment; or
(2) One percent (1%) of the then outstanding principal balance of
the Note.
As used in this Note, "Reinvestment Rate" shall be the yield to ma-
turity on a United States Treasury bond or note (the choice of which
security to be used for such purposes being in the sole discretion of
[Defendant]) having a maturity date of January 2, 2020 (or the ma-
turity date closest thereto if no such bond or note has a maturity
date of January 2, 2020).128
According to the court, the prepayment provision represented the
present value of: "(1) the interest income from the remaining principal
VALIC would have received under the Loan rate for the remainder of
the Loan (2) minus the interest income VALIC would obtain if the
remaining principal [was] invested at the reinvestment rate for the re-
mainder of the Loan's term. ' 129 VALIC included an identical provi-
sion in all of its loan documents. 130 The purpose of the provision was
to make the lender whole on a similar investment: The borrower paid
the interest spread between the current loan rate and the yield on a
Treasury note, so "the lender [was] financially 'indifferent' to being
126. Id. at *1.
127. Id. at *2.
128. Id. at *2-3.
129. Id. at *9 ("In other words, the prepayment provision should represent the present value
of the lost interest on the remaining principal over the term of the Loan if VALIC reinvested the
principal in a comparable investment at the reinvestment rate.").
130. Id. at *3 ("VALIC's loan officer was unaware of any instance in which a borrower was
able to negotiate a change in the provision in 1999 .... [T]wenty other VALIC notes from 1999
contained identical prepayment provisions.").
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prepaid.' 131 As a practical matter, the borrower's prepayment fee in-
creased as the yield on the Treasury note decreased. During negotia-
tions, River East questioned the enforceability of the provision. 132 The
week before River East executed the contract, the attorney for River
East issued a letter expressing "no opinion" as to the enforceability of
the provision.133
In 2003, River East sold the mortgaged property but remained lia-
ble for the mortgage. 134 Later that year, River East filed suit in the
Circuit Court of Cook County, seeking a declaratory judgment that
the prepayment clause was unenforceable as a matter of law.135
VALIC removed the action to the Northern District of Illinois, East-
ern Division, based on the diversity of jurisdiction between the par-
ties. 136 Because the District Court was sitting in diversity, it had to
apply state law in a manner consistent with the state courts and in
accord with the reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court.1 37
The issue before the court was whether the yield-maintenance
clause was enforceable. 138 River East claimed the clause was a penalty
punishing early payment and therefore unenforceable as a matter of
law.139 Specifically, River East argued the lender was overcompen-
sated because the reinvestment rate was based solely upon a Treasury
note with a maturity date similar to the loan.1 40 River East maintained
that VALIC should have added a basis point spread 141 to the treasury
rate.
42
131. River E. Plaza, L.L.C., 2006 WL 2787483, at *6 ("[T]his is achieved by the borrower
paying to the lender the interest spread between the current loan rate and the new investment
vehicle chosen by the lender ....").
132. Id. at *3 (VALIC responded that the prepayment provision was part of their "form"
document and was non-negotiable).
133. Id. (When questioned, counsel for plaintiff informed defendant that she could not pro-
vide a positive opinion as to the enforceability of the prepayment provision.).
134. Id. at *5.
135. Id.
136. River E. Plaza, L.L.C., 2006 WL 2787483, at.*5; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2007).
137. A federal court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of the state in which the
district resides. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
138. River E Plaza, L.L.C., 2006 WL 2787483 at *1.
139. Id. at *5.
140. Id. at *10.
141. An interest rate spread refers to the "number of basis points over a base rate index; the
difference between the rate at which money can be borrowed and the rate at which it is loaned."
Principle Commercial Corp. Glossary of Terms, http://www.principlecommercial.com/Glossary.
aspx#I (last visited July 27, 2008).
142. River E. Plaza, L.L.C., 2006 WL 2787483 at *10 (stating that the plaintiff contended that
without a spread, the yield-maintenance clause made defendant more than whole, for reasons
explained in greater detail below).
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The court made the critical determination that the law of liquidated
damages 143 governed the analysis of prepayment provisions. 144 This
determination framed the court's entire analysis. Pursuant to liqui-
dated damages law, a prepayment provision is enforceable when it
meets the following requirements, set out in Jameson Realty Group:
(1) [T]he amount of damages was reasonable at the time of con-
tracting in that they bear some relation to the damages which might
have been sustained; (2) the amount of actual damages from a
breach would be uncertain and difficult to prove at the time of con-
tracting; and (3) the parties intended to agree in advance to the set-
tlement of damages that might arise from a breach. 145
The court determined the prepayment provision did not satisfy the
Jameson criteria because the yield-maintenance clause was unreasona-
ble at the time of contracting and did not bear some relation to the
damages which might have been sustained. 146
The court accepted River East's argument that the yield-mainte-
nance clause was unreasonable because it was based upon a nearly
risk-free investment: a Treasury note.147 In the commercial loan,
VALIC had accepted the risk of debtor non-payment as part of the
bargain. 148 If the yield-maintenance was enforceable, VALIC could
143. See WILLISTON, supra note 50, 65:1 (providing "[it is generally agreed that a liquidated
damages provision does not violate public policy when, at the time the parties enter into the
contract containing the clause, the circumstances are such that the actual damages likely to flow
from a subsequent breach would be difficult for the parties to estimate or for the nonbreaching
party to prove, and the sum agreed upon is designed merely to compensate the nonbreacher for
the other party's failure to perform. On the other hand, a liquidated damages provision will be
held to violate public policy, and hence will not be enforced, when it is intended to punish, or has
the effect of punishing, a party for breaching the contract, or when there is a large disparity
between the amount payable under the provision and the actual damages likely to be caused by a
breach, so that it in effect seeks to coerce performance of the underlying agreement by penalizing
non-performance and making a breach prohibitively and unreasonably costly.) (emphasis added).
144. River E. Plaza, L.L.C, 2006 WL 2787483, at *8.
145. Id.
146. Id. at *12.
147. "[Tlhe prevailing interest rate on a Treasury security will always be lower than the pre-
vailing rate on a commercial real estate loan because of the difference in risk of the latter." Id.
See also Financial Web U.S. Treasury Securities, http://www.finweb.com/investing/us-treasury-
securities.html (last visited July 21, 2007), which states:
United States Treasury Securities, also known as Treasuries, are fixed-income security
instruments issued by the U.S. Treasury.... Most investors regard U.S. Treasury Secur-
ities as one of the safest investment vehicles in the world. This is because they're
backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government, which is considered
an excellent credit risk due to the size and diverse nature of the U.S. economy and the
stability of the U.S. political system.
148. River E. Plaza, L.L.C., 2006 WL 2787483, at *10. See also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS
301 (Jane A. Malonis ed., Gale Group 2d ed. 2000), which states:
In granting loans, the bank must balance the benefit of the additional interest income
generated against the cost of a default on the loan. To estimate the probability that a
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have received interest without any risk by reinvesting the principal
and the prepayment fee in treasuries. 149 Alternatively, VALIC could
have received an even greater return by reinvesting the principal and
the prepayment fee in a comparable commercial real estate loan. 150
Either way, VALIC would receive a windfall.' 51 Following a bench
trial, Judge Harrah entered judgment in favor of River East, and re-
duced the prepayment fee from $3,885,679.00 to $123,012.15.152
The court also agreed with River East that VALIC should have ap-
plied a "spread" of interest points to the Treasury note rate to reflect
the additional risk associated with mortgages. 153 The court calculated
this spread by subtracting the Treasury note rate at the inception of
the loan (6.75%) from the interest rate on the loan (8.02%). 15 4 This
difference came out to 127 basis points, or 1.27%.155 This total repre-
sented the risk differential: At the time of the loan, the difference
between investing in the commercial loan and in a lower-risk treasury
note was 127 basis points.156 According to the court, VALIC should
have added this risk differential to the Treasury note rate when calcu-
lating the amount owed under the prepayment provision. 157 Under
this adjusted rate, VALIC would neither suffer a loss from prepay-
borrower will pay, banks gather information on their potential customers .... Banks
often use credit scoring models that predict future payment performance ....
149. River E. Plaza, L.L.C., 2006 WL 2787483, at *10. See also Seth Lubove & Elizabeth
Stanton, Pimco Power in Treasuries, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 20, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sidaYxf.yAPdYcc&refer=home ("Investors view Treasuries as
among the world's safest and most liquid investments.").
150. River E. Plaza, L.L.C., 2006 WL 2787483, at *10.
151. "VALIC does not explain why a loan spread could not have been calculated.., to insure
that, while VALIC would not suffer a loss from prepayment, VALIC did not receive a windfall
as here." Id.
152. "Because the yield-maintenance clause of the prepayment provision is an unenforceable
penalty, the prepayment provision's second clause.., providing a prepayment charge of 1% of
the remaining principal on the loan, determines the prepayment fee." Id. at *12.
153. See id. ("liquidated damages clause is most likely not a reasonable attempt to estimate
the actual damages if the amount of damages is unchanging to the gravity of the breach").
154. Id. at *6.
155. Id.
156. "This is the amount ... that would be added to the rate at [the date of the loan's incep-
tion] to make VALIC financially 'indifferent' to the proposed prepayment because VALIC
would be fully compensated as though the loan had been paid over the entire term." River E.
Plaza, L.L.C., 2006 WL 2787483, at *6.
157. According to the Northern District of Illinois:
The use of Treasuries as the reinvestment rate can overcompensate a lender if it does
not have a differential added because the lender can purchase a Treasury without the
risk present in the CREM [(Commercial Real Estate Mortgage)] loan because a Trea-
sury security is backed by the United States Government. A CREM loan compensates
the lender for taking the comparatively higher risks of default and impairment to collat-
eral by receiving a premium interest rate. Therefore, the prevailing interest rate on a
CREM loan is higher than the interest rate paid on a Treasury security with the same
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ment, nor receive a windfall. 158 This adjusted rate would also diminish
the borrower's exposure in the event the Treasury note fell signifi-
cantly between the time of the loan's execution and the notice of pre-
payment, as it had in the instant case. 159
Several other factors influenced the court's decision. When de-
posed, an officer at VALIC's parent company described the prepay-
ment provision as "very, very punitive.' 160 The court cited this
testimony in support of its finding that the provision was an unen-
forceable penalty, designed primarily to punish nonperformance. 161
The court determined that VALIC, at all relevant times, could have
reinvested the prepaid funds in a comparable-risk investment within
one day of River East's notice of intent to prepay or of actual receipt
of the prepaid funds.162 VALIC had sufficient funds to make any type
of a thirteen million dollar investment. 163 Since VALIC could other-
wise mitigate its losses, the court presumably considered this as evi-
dence that the prepayment provision was unreasonable. 164
In support of its holding, the court cited several cases from other
jurisdictions, 165 which held that if a prepayment provision was dispro-
portionate and did not bear a reasonable relation to the probable
damages, then the provision was a penalty and invalid. 166 In the cited
cases, the courts found the use of a treasury-based reinvestment rate
without adding an additional spread of points constituted an imper-
missible penalty. 167
VI. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT RESTORES THE STATUS QUO
VALIC promptly appealed the decision of the District Court to the
Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit's opinion begins by noting the
maturity date. VALIC's average real estate loan was 132 basis points over the average
Treasury bill rate....
Id.
158. Id.
159. See River E. Plaza, L.L.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir.
2007).
160. River E. Plaza, L.L.C., 2006 WL 2787483, at *12.
161. Id. at *12 n.6 ("An adverse inference is drawn from VALIC's failure to call [the officer]
as a witness at trial to explain his prior testimony . .
162. Id. at *7.
163. Id.
164. "[A] plaintiff's failure to mitigate, when mitigation is reasonable and would operate to
reduce the plaintiff's loss, will result in a dollar for dollar reduction in the recovery by the
amount not mitigated." FISCHER, supra note 54, at § 13.2.
165. River E. Plaza, L.L.C., 2006 WL 2787483, at *10 (citing In re Kroh Bros. Dev. Corp, 88
B.R. 997 (W.D. Mo. 1988)); In re Skyler Ridge, 80 B.R. 500 (C.D. Cal. 1987)).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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Illinois Supreme Court has not adopted a test for determining when a
prepayment fee amounts to a penalty.168 Nevertheless, the Seventh
Circuit applied a liquidated damages analysis to the prepayment pro-
vision.169 However, the court first considered the "relative value of
any alternatives."'170 At the time River East prepaid its loan, the note
had nearly thirteen million dollars in remaining interest obligations.171
The prepayment provision required River East to pay only $3.9 mil-
lion of that outstanding interest. 72 With this finding, the court
promptly concluded the provision had not been inserted into the loan
for the "sole purpose of securing performance of the contract. 1 73 The
court never explained the significance of this finding; presumably, the
court considered the prepayment as less of an expenditure of $3.9 mil-
lion than as a savings of $9.1 million.
The court's hesitancy to disrupt the status quo is apparent through-
out the opinion. The court noted the sophistication of the parties and
reiterated the traditional contract rule that parties have the freedom
to contract however they wish. 174 The court recognized that although
VALIC had contracted to receive $16.4 million in interest over the
course of twenty years, most of that interest was front-loaded into the
first ten years of the loan.175 VALIC received $3.45 million between
the first and third years of the loan, and an additional $3.9 million
during the fourth year. 176 In addition to the return of the entire princi-
pal, VALIC received some $7.35 million in interest and prepayment
fees. Thus, VALIC received roughly twenty million dollars of un-
restricted funds in the four years following the initial loan.
VALIC could have immediately reinvested this money into either
risk-free federal treasuries or a comparable commercial loan, two op-
tions which offered VALIC a position far superior to its role as credi-
tor. Throughout the life of the loan, River East ran the risk it would
be unable to meet its loan obligations. This risk would have disap-
peared if VALIC reinvested the money into federal treasuries. Alter-
natively, VALIC could have reinvested the twenty million dollars in
168. River E. Plaza, L.L.C., 498 F.3d at 721.
169. Id. at 722 ("Illinois will not enforce penalty clauses,.., some liquidated damages clauses
cross the line and become penalty clauses in disguise, the underlying question is whether this
clause is punitive in nature.").
170. Id.
171. Id. at 723.
172. Id.
173. River E. Plaza, L.L.C., 498 F.3d at 723 (citing Checkers Eight Ltd. v. Hawkins, 241 F.3d
558, 562 (7th Cir. 2001)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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another commercial loan, thereby earning a return on the $3.9 million
comparable to the original loan with River East. Thus, VALIC could
choose either a risk-free investment earning a return virtually identi-
cal to its original commercial loan or a commercial real estate mort-
gage with earnings that exceeded its original commercial loan. Yet, the
$3.9 million was intended to represent lost interest!
The prepayment provision created considerable opportunities for
VALIC, but the Seventh Circuit did not find them persuasive. When
River East argued that the prepayment provision overcompensated
VALIC, the court vacuously demanded, "compared to what? '177 Ac-
cording to the court, VALIC's investment in risk-free treasuries would
not compensate the lender as fully as the original loan.178 The court's
puzzling explanation is flawed. Consider the court's restatement of
plaintiff's argument: "[Plaintiff's] unwritten assumption in such a
formula is that VALIC can take the returned principal, invest it in
Treasuries, and by taking the income from the Treasuries and adding it
to the prepayment fee, VALIC gets the exact return it expected from
the loan. ' 1 79 This misstates the plaintiff's position. Plaintiff asserted
VALIC could invest the returned principal, interest, and prepayment
fee in Treasuries. Such an investment would have given VALIC the
expected return from the loan without any of the risk.
The court did not offer any reason for its conclusion that reinvest-
ment into a comparable commercial loan would overcompensate the
lender. Instead, the court found the following ironic:
In trying to argue that the prepayment clause is a penalty, which by
definition is a clause whose sole purpose is to secure the perform-
ance of the contract, River East [claimed] that VALIC would have
been effectively worse off if the contract had been repaid over the
term of the loan instead of prepaid. 180
This purported irony did not prevent the court from acknowledging
that if the lender had reinvested in a comparable commercial loan, it
would have recovered more than it would have from the original loan:
[M]any players in the industry have adjusted their prepayment
clauses to account for some of that cushion between the Treasury
rate and the loan's rate by adding ... basis points to the discounted
rate.... But even the lenders who are most generous, by adding
twenty-five or fifty basis points to the Treasuries, would have made
an "unreasonable" fee according to River East's argument because
177. Id.
178. River E. Plaza, L.L.C., 498 F.3d at 723.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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the fee would allow them to recover more from their future invest-
ments than they would have from the original borrower.181
The court did not explain this apparent contradiction in its findings.
The court held for VALIC, with a terse explanation: "[A] contrary
result would have broad implications for both lenders and borrowers
•.. and might inadvertently effect a wide-ranging alteration of the law
of real estate financing in Illinois. [This responsibility] rests with the
courts of Illinois, and not with the federal courts .... "182 While the
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that developments in Illinois law
should come from the Illinois courts, the Seventh Circuit declined to
certify the issue to the Illinois Supreme Court for instruction.
VII. AN UNADDRESSED ISSUE
Neither the Seventh Circuit nor the District Court addressed the
relevance of the "lost volume seller" rule. VALIC could have argued
its operations were akin to those of a volume seller, and therefore, the
company was entitled to the benefit of the rule. A lost volume seller is
one who would have made, for example, two sales and two profits
rather than only one sale and one profit if the buyer had not breached
the agreement. 183 Thus, even if VALIC had reinvested the prepaid
principal in a new mortgage, VALIC would not have been fully com-
pensated. VALIC presumably would have invested in an additional
mortgage regardless of River East's prepayment of its mortgage.
The lost volume seller rule is an exception to the general rule of
mitigation, granting the seller the expectancy of both contracts, rather
than requiring the seller to give up one expectancy interest to mitigate
damages. 184 The rule, however, is "commonly understood to apply
[only] to contracts involving the sale of consumer goods.' 85 Whether
an Illinois court would apply the rule to a mortgage remains un-
resolved. However, even if the rule applied to mortgages, courts have
the discretion to deny recovery of expectancy damages for public pol-
icy reasons. 86
181. Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 725-26.
183. FISCHER, supra note 54, at § 13.8.2.
184. Id.
185. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 833 A.2d 891, 897 (Conn. 2003) (holding that the rule also
applies to personal service contracts).
186. Wilson v. Los Angeles County Metro. Transit Auth., 1 P.3d 63, 70 (Cal. 2000).
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VIII. BUSINESS AS USUAL
The Northern District analyzed a contractual provision without
clear guidance from the Illinois Supreme Court, but it grounded its
holding in generally recognized contract principles. Prepayment provi-
sions fit well within the rubric of liquidated damages, and the Seventh
Circuit should have upheld the district court decision. The Seventh
Circuit also should have certified the issue for review by the Illinois
Supreme Court.187 Instead, the court crafted a disingenuous analysis,
misstating and undermining River East's position.
The Northern District called attention to a problem now plaguing
millions of Americans. Although the court considered a prepayment
provision in the context of a commercial mortgage, the court's analysis
was relevant to residential mortgages as well. Ultimately, whether or
not to subject a prepayment provision to a liquidated damages analy-
sis turns on the similarity of the prepayment provision to a liquidated
damages provision. The analysis has nothing to do with whether the
mortgage was commercial or residential. The Northern District's hold-
ing had ramifications for the entire lending industry in Illinois. The
case marked an important break from the tradition of complete defer-
ence to the freedom of contract. Parties should have the ability to in-
clude freely negotiated terms, but given the broad public policy
ramifications of prepayment provisions, courts should carefully scruti-
nize such provisions. For now, the law of mortgages remains mired in
the past while tradition handcuffs justice.
IX. CHANGING THE STATUS QUO
The Federal Reserve Board 188 has cut interest rates aggressively. 189
As the rift between the rates on ARMs and federal funds expands, the
opportunities for cash-strapped mortgagees created by refinancing are
even more apparent. 90 If the current economic crisis continues, the
187. ILCS S. CT. R. 20(A). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 20 provides that when the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has pending before it a case involving a question
of State law that may be determinative, and the Illinois Supreme Court has no controlling prece-
dents, the Seventh Circuit may certify the question to the Illinois Supreme Court for instruction.
Id.
188. The Federal Reserve is the central bank of the United States. "The Federal Reserve
exercises control over the demand for and supply of balances that depository institutions hold at
the Reserve Banks. In so doing, it influences the federal funds rate, and ultimately, employment,
output, and prices." THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, PURPOSES & FUNc-rjONs 27 (Federal Re-
serve Sys. ed., 9th ed. 2005) (1939), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pfL3.pdf.
189. The Federal Reserve Board, FRB: Monetary Policy, Open Market Operations, (2008),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm
190. This is true even though the federal fund rate does not always immediately translate into
reduced mortgage rates. See, e.g., John W. Schoen, Why are mortgage rates up if the Fed is cut-
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problems created by prepayment provisions may become less relevant
if lenders ridden with bad debt refuse to refinance subprime borrow-
ers. If lenders cannot or will not offer refinancing to high-risk borrow-
ers, 191 then draconian prepayment provisions are less important.
However, given the number of Americans currently trapped in high-
rate ARMs, prepayment provisions remain relevant.
The problems raised by prepayment provisions are plaguing con-
sumers, exacerbating the mortgage crisis already besetting the nation.
Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke expects delinquencies and fore-
closures to continue to rise for the foreseeable future and continues to
call for measures to reduce preventable foreclosures. 192
The government has been forced into action. While the decision to
place Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship increased the
likelihood that future Americans will be able to secure financing and
purchase homes, it provided little relief to the ever-increasing number
of mortgage foreclosures. Some in the government recognized the
problem of prepayment provisions long before the subprime mortgage
crisis began. For example, the Treasury Department (the "Treasury")
formed a task force to analyze the problems of predatory lending in
2000.193 The Treasury explained, "where the borrower refinances a
loan with a prepayment penalty, the cost of that penalty may be fi-
nanced in the new loan balance, driving up the overall price of the
loan to the borrower. ' 194 The Treasury suggested further restrictions
on prepayment penalties to make it more economical for some fami-
lies to refinance their loans. "The ability to refinance at successively
lower interest rates over time may allow more borrowers to graduate
from the subprime to the prime market."'1 95 Unfortunately, these sug-
gestions only applied to loans that refinanced existing mortgages
charging more than ten percent above the yield on Treasuries.
ting?, MSNBC, Mar. 2, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23412069/ (quoting Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke, "Even as the Fed has lowered interest rates, and as the general pattern
of interest rates has declined, the pressures in the credit markets have caused greater and greater
spread, particular [sic] for risky borrowers .....
191. According to Chairman Bernanke:
In the past, subprime borrowers were often able to avoid resets by refinancing, but
currently that avenue is largely closed. Borrowers are hampered not only by their lack
of equity but also by the tighter credit conditions in mortgage markets. New securitiza-
tions of nonprime mortgages have virtually halted, and commercial banks have tight-
ened their standards, especially for riskier mortgages. Indeed, the available evidence
suggests that private lenders are originating few nonprime loans at any terms.
Bernanke, supra note 24.
192. Id.
193. Task Force, supra note 46.
194. Id. at 94.
195. Id. at 95.
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Governor Kroszner 96 recently announced the intent of the Federal
Reserve-whose plutocratic members bear much of the responsibility
for this mess-to establish new rules allowing the subprime market to
function in a way that is safe for borrowers and profitable for lenders.
The proposal addresses "abusive lending practice and establishes new
standards for subprime lending, prepayment penalties, escrow ac-
counts, and verification of assets and income."'1 97 The government
needs to expand regulation of the lending industry, 198 even if expan-
sion has little retroactive effect on homeowners trapped in high-cost
mortgages. The proposal would limit prepayment penalties in
"'higher-priced mortgage loans' secured by the consumer's principal
dwelling."' 99 Prepayment penalties would not apply for at least sixty
days prior to any possible payment increases. 200
In late 2007, Senator Christopher Dodd 201 introduced The Home-
ownership Preservation and Protection Act of 2007.202 The Act would
establish additional protection for subprime mortgagors2 03 and bor-
196. Randall S. Kroszner, Ph.D. is a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System of the United States and is the Governor responsible for banking regulation.
197. Brian Collins, Fed Will Bolster Housing, NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS ONLINE, Jan. 14, 2008,
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/premium/archive/?id=158209.
198. According to Randall Kroszner:
[I]n 2006, over 45% of high-cost first mortgages were originated by independent mort-
gage companies [which are not regulated by federal banking agencies]. In addition,
prior to late 2005, high demand for housing and rising house prices allowed borrowers
to recover from these risk through profitable home sales and refinancings [sic], hiding
the weakened underwriting standards from view.
Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Testimony Before
the U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Fin. Servs.: Loan Modifications and Foreclosure
Prevention (Dec. 6, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/tes-
timony/kroszner20071206a.htm).
199. According to the Federal Reserve Board:
The rule would define 'higher-priced mortgage loan' to capture loans in the subprime
market but generally exclude loans in the prime market. A loan would be covered if it
is a first-lien mortgage and has an annual percentage rate (APR) that is three percent-
age points or more above the yield on comparable Treasury notes, or if it is a
subordinate-lien mortgage with an APR exceeding the comparable Treasury rate by
five points or more.
Press Release, Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Dec. 18, 2007) (available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20071218a.htm).
200. Id.
201. Senator Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT) has been a member of Congress for more than
thirty-eight years. He is currently the chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs. This committee has jurisdiction over all matters relating to
banks, banking, financial institutions, and the Federal Reserve System.
202. Home Ownership and Protection Act of 2007, S. 2452, 110th Cong. (2007).
203. The Act defines subprime mortgages as "[m]ortgages that have interest rates that are 3
percentage points higher than Treasury securities of comparable maturities for first mortgages
and 5 percentage points for second mortgages." Id.
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rowers who obtain nontraditional mortgages. 20 4 Among other things,
the Act would prohibit prepayment penalties on subprime loans. 20 5
Recently, Senator Richard Durbin20 6 announced legislation to address
problems of prepayment penalties in the bankruptcy context. Accord-
ing to Senator Durbin, the "Helping Families Save Their Homes In
Bankruptcy Act of 2007" would help over 600,000 people facing fore-
closure.20 7 Under current law, bankruptcy judges cannot modify the
terms of the first mortgage on a consumer's principal residence. 208
Senator Durbin's Act would allow, among other things, bankruptcy
judges to waive prepayment provisions.
Congress could extend a bailout to borrowers without jeopardizing
taxpayer dollars. Such a bailout would benefit people with decent jobs
and incomes, who could afford a normal mortgage, by extricating
them from the exotic loans and prepayment penalties threatening to
cost them their primary residences. 20 9
This could also be a chance for federalism to shine. A number of
states, fed up with the time it has taken Congress to act, have adopted
legislation to protect their homeowners. 210 The bills run the gamut,
from restricting prepayment penalties on all loans to requiring lenders
to offer prospective borrowers loans without prepayment penalties. 21'
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Senator Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) is the Majority Whip of the U.S. Senate, the second highest
position in the party leadership in the Senate.
207. New Report Underscores Need for Durbin Mortgage Foreclosure Bill, UNITED STATES
SENATOR DICK DURBIN, Nov. 14, 2007, http:lldurbin.senate.gov/showRelease.cfm?releaseld=
287492. "Today, virtually every type of personal debt, including vacation homes and family
farms, can be restructured in bankruptcy with the exception of mortgages on a primary resi-
dence. This exception dates to the 1970's, when most mortgages were fixed rate, long term agree-
ments." Id.
208. Michael A. Hiltzik, Lenders derail home relief plan, L.A. TIMES, April 22, 2008, available
at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/apr/22/business/fi-bankrupt22.
209. John W. Schoen, Should Congress Bailout Borrowers in Trouble, MSNBC, Sept. 9, 2007,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20647417/. "By identifying those with relatively good
credit, nullifying the prepayment penalty, and letting them back under the risk umbrella of FHA
insurance or the Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae conforming loans that they should have been sold
in the first place, you could also lower their payments." Id.
210. Alison Vekshin, States Push Subprime-Lending Laws as Congress Lags, BLOOMBERG.
COM, July 10, 2007, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&refer=
politics&sid=a2OzDA13SxJM (quoting Minnesota Attorney General Lori Swanson).
211. Id. As discussed earlier, borrowers in Illinois already have some protections from unfair
or predatory lending practices.
Specifically, subprime loans made for refinances that exceed certain triggers - such as
an interest rate that is 6 percentage points higher than the prevailing rate on U.S. Trea-
sury securities of comparable maturity - can't have a prepayment penalty in effect for
more than the first three years of the loan. Moreover, the penalty can't then exceed 3
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X. CONCLUSION
Until and unless Congress acts, the duty of protecting homeowners
from abusive lenders falls to the state governments and courts. Unfor-
tunately, River East212 effectively negates the possibility that federal
courts will shield homeowners from crippling prepayment penalties.
While the Seventh Circuit decision does not bind state courts, chal-
lenges to the enforceability of prepayment provisions will often find
venue in the district courts, due to the diversity of jurisdiction be-
tween borrowers and lenders. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion has persuasive value for state courts.
Therefore, it is unfortunate the Seventh Circuit did not devote the
time or effort necessary to craft a more thoughtful analysis. The court
properly recognized the need for significant changes in state law, yet
the court failed to certify the issue for review by the Illinois Supreme
Court. Although the district court decision would have granted some
relief to cash-strapped mortgagees, the appellate court effectively
maintained the status quo by misstating the plaintiffs' arguments and
ignoring the punitive aspects of the prepayment provision. Maintain-
ing the status quo is crippling the nation.
percent of the loan principal during the first year, 2 percent in the second and 1 percent
in the third.
Marilyn Kennedy Melia, The Penalty for Early Payoff, CHi. TRIB., Feb. 20, 2005, available at
http://www.chicagotribune.com/classified/realestate/financing/chi-0502200479feb20,,5872970.
story.
212. River E. Plaza, L.L.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2007).
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